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Abstract
The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the
efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can
improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favor of more "deserving"
workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market
contracts - separating the various worker types - the more likely it is that such
output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse
effects can be mitigated by restricting mandates to "large" firms. An alternative to a
mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government
provision may be superior to mandates by virtue of preserving separations.
Non-technical Summary
Labor economists have typically provided rather flimsy theoretical
justification for government mandates that require firms to provide their workers
with certain benefits (e.g. dismissals protection or health insurance). This paper
draws on the insurance literature and the notion of asymmetric information to
provide a more satisfactory basis for discussion of the efficiency properties of
mandates that have such insurance characteristics.
We report that governments may indeed raise welfare by requiring firms to
provide insurance-type benefits to their employees. The result is derived for a world
of homogeneous firms and two types of worker who differ in their degree of
"riskiness" to the firm. The result holds both when the contracts offered by the firms
distinguish between the two types of worker (a "separating" equilibrium) and when
they do not ("pooling"). By improving worker insurance, mandates can achieve
improvements in welfare (smooth the allocation of income across worker states).
Moreover, the redistribution involved - from low-risk to high-risk workers - may
favor "deserving" workers, as will occur where the transfer is from healthy to
unhealthy workers, and hence accord with equity considerations.
But the efficiency result is by no means guaranteed. Mandates impose
pooling contracts given their typical one-size-fits-all nature. If we relax the
assumption that firms are homogeneous and instead allow the costs of worker
"failure" to differ between firms, then real-world contracts need to differentiate
between types of workers to reflect such cost differences. For example, small firms
may have greater difficulty when a woman takes maternity leave than their larger
counterparts. Small firms may therefore need to offer a "no frills" contact (with high
pay but no maternity leave) in order to deter applications from high maternity-risk
workers. Larger firms may be less concerned. Under these circumstances, we show
that that the pooling occasioned by a mandate will lower output and reduce average
income. Small firms will then have a random mix of workers. Restricting the reach
of a mandate to large firms in such circumstances can preserve efficiency. In short,
targeting is required.
Interestingly, mandates are often depicted as superior to direct government
provision because of the tax distortions associated with the latter. However, we are
able to show that direct provision can dominate the outcomes associated with
mandates, and even yield Pareto improvements. For example, government funding
of maternity pay can dominate mandates requiring firms to fund such pay. This




In recent years, the case for government regulation of labor markets has been
supplemented by a new literature that exploits asymmetric information. Thus
Summers (1989, 179) has argued that government mandates requiring firms to
provide benefits can bring about an improvement in welfare in circumstances in
which company schemes would be overwhelmed by adverse selection stemming
from workers’ or firms’ private information.
Summers sees adverse selection as relevant specifically to each of the fringes:
health insurance, parental leave, and dismissals protection. In each of these cases
the worker may suffer some unforeseen contingency, and the employer then provide
a "wage" or "benefit" not matched by work done. This may be an insurance payout
(health insurance); or an insurance payout and a guarantee of the job on return to
work (parental leave); or the job and a wage when the employer’s ability to fire at
will is restricted (dismissals protection). In each case, adverse selection due to
asymmetric information may discourage firms from providing the fringe benefit. In
the ensuing labor literature, Levine (1991) on dismissals protection and Ruhm
(1998) on parental leave develop the point, while Krueger (1994, 300) has also
contended that solving adverse selection may be one of the functions that in the
labor market context government does best. Aghion and Hermalin (1989) is another
progenitor of the basic idea.
The labor market literature is closely related to the literature on adverse
selection in insurance markets - for which the seminal work is by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) - even if the latter literature is much more
developed. The insurance literature finds that the problem of adverse selection is
reduced if insurance companies can offer loss-making contracts subsidized by
profit-making contracts (Cave, 1984, and Stewart, 1994); or again if in a
2multiperiod framework insurance companies can use loss experience to reclassify
policy holders (Dione and Lasserre, 1987, and Cooper and Hayes, 1987).
The discussion of labor market mandates has mostly proceeded informally.
Summers (1989, 182) has however called for more formal analysis, the provision of
which is a principal task of our paper. The models we build for this purpose are in
direct line of descent from Wilson (1977). We follow Hellwig’s (1987) game
theoretic development of Wilson, translating the model to a labor market context
that is richer than the original in view of its technological complexity. We also
make central the issue of the role of government.
We have not thought it appropriate to incorporate the refinements found in
the insurance market literature, noted earlier. These would imply that a firm
routinely offers any group of its workers a menu of contracts embracing differing
levels of health insurance, parental leave, dismissals protection, and so on. Such
menus are not observed in practice. Indeed, adopting a variety of standards for a
fringe benefit would typically conflict with "norms of fairness" (Levine, 1991, 296)
and also confront legal constraints.
The question at issue is: can government by mandating labor market benefits
increase welfare? In our simplest model with homogeneous firms, in both the
separating and pooling cases, a mandate can achieve efficient allocation of income
across states (i.e. secure "full insurance"), accompanied by a redistribution of
income among workers. In some instances, this redistribution also appears to be
equitable and thus to favor "deserving" workers. In this way, the Summers (1989)
case for mandates is formalized. However, in the more general model that allows
heterogeneous firms, the mandate is shown to reduce output in the separating case.
This is because, whereas the free market exploits separation to match worker types
efficiently to firms, a mandate imposes pooling and substitutes a random allocation
of workers to firms. Whenever a sorting mechanism based on separation exists, it is
necessarily eliminated by the imposition of a mandate. In the separating case, then,
3a loss of productive efficiency results, making it less likely that the mandate is
desirable.
One may be able to get round this misallocation when, for example,
heterogeneity is restricted to the distinction between "small" and "large" firms, and
the government is able to target large firms. Under such a "restricted" mandate,
there may be no loss of output. In the most likely scenario, incomplete coverage can
short-circuit adverse effects on labor allocation, thereby providing a rather strong
case for restricting any mandate to large firms. It is clear though that the general
problem of firm heterogeneity remains.
Summers (1989) discusses the advantages of a mandate over direct
government provision in terms of it not distorting prices. We can, however, point to
a disadvantage: we are able to show that the adverse effects on labor allocation
described above are avoidable through direct government provision of the benefit.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a basic statement of
the asymmetric information model with homogeneous firms. The scope for
achieving welfare improvements within this framework is examined in Section III.
The effects of introducing firm heterogeneity are discussed in Section IV. Section V
tackles the issue of government provision as an alternative to mandates. Section VI
concludes.
3 The Model
We start with the general case. There are r types of firms, each type producing
a different good, and n types of worker (as defined below). Many firms of each type
and many workers of each type play a 3-stage game. In stage 1, each firm offers a
contract; in stage 2, each worker accepts one of the contracts on offer; and in stage
3, a firm may if it wishes withdraw the contract offered in stage 1. (Allowing firms
to withdraw contracts is consistent with the notion of long-run competitive
behavior. It also ensures that the game has a solution: see Hellwig, 1987.) There are
4two states of nature for each worker. After completion of the game’s three stages,
the state of nature is in each case realized and firms and workers receive their
payoffs.
The two states of nature correspond to "success" or "failure" on the part of the
worker, where for example a worker may fail because of ill health, maternity leave,
or an inability to cope with the job. The effect is that a worker’s product is less in
the "bad" state (failure) than the "good" state (success).
A worker has a continuously differentiable Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, U(.) (the same for all workers), that is separable in income and prices.
Thus, fixing the general level of prices (defined appropriately), the worker’s utility
depends, ex ante, only on the probability of failure and the income received in the
different states. Suppose that if a worker accepts a contract (b,w), U=UF(b) if the
bad state occurs and U=US(w) in the good state. That is, ex post, utility is state-
dependent. Further, suppose that workers are risk averse and worker types
distinguished by the probability of failure.
Labor is the only factor of production. For a given state of nature each of the r
goods is produced under constant returns. Thus, for a given type of firm, a worker’s
product in the bad state is a constant proportion of the worker’s product in the good
state. This proportion varies, however, with the type of firm. Intuitively, this is
because the failure of a worker may cause greater difficulties for some types of firm
than others. For example, we would argue that absence through illness is more
disruptive in small firms than in large firms, where it is easier to arrange cover for
absence.1
Firms are competitive and risk neutral, and competition in the markets for
goods and labor drives their expected profits - revenue minus wages - to zero. Thus,
                                          
1 The OECD (1995, 190) surveys parental leave in 19 countries, and states that the absence of a key worker for a
long period creates difficulties for small firms. Hence the exemption, for example, of firms employing less than 50
5the price of a good is in each case determined by average (equal to marginal) cost,
which in turn depends on the mix of workers, their probabilities of failure, their
productivities in good and bad states, and their wages in these states. In Section IV
we will see how policy may affect this mix of workers, costs and the structure of
prices.
Assume for the present the specialization of our model to r=1, that is,
homogeneous firms and just one produced good, and n=2, namely, two types of
worker. Given the price of the good, in the good state a firm receives a fixed
revenue of S per worker, and in the bad state a fixed revenue of F per worker, where
0≤F<S. Both S and F are independent of the number of workers hired, given
constant returns.
According to the terms of a contract, the firm pays wages b in the bad state
and w in the good state. Thus a contract is a pair of values, (b,w), where b may
include a "benefit". Define this benefit as b-F - a benefit is paid if the wage in the
bad state is greater than the worker’s revenue product. Assuming the benefit cannot
be negative, we have
(1) b ≥ F.
In addition, however, a higher minimum level for b - fixed either in absolute terms
or as a proportion of w - can be mandated by the government. (The government
could also provide the benefit directly; this issue is taken up in Section V.)
The two types of worker are a "low-risk" type for whom the probability, PL,
of the bad state is low, and a "high-risk" type for whom the probability, PH, is high.
The corresponding "odds ratios" are QL=PL/(1-PL) and QH=PH/(1-PH). An
indifference curve for the low-risk type is described by
(2) PLUF(b) + (1-PL)US(w) = k,
                                                                                                                                         
workers from the provisions of the 1993 U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act.
6where k is a constant. Differentiating with respect to b gives
(3) PLUF′ + (1-PL)US′(dw/db) = 0.
As QL=PL/(1-PL), the indifference curve’s slope is, from (3),
(4) dw/db = - QLUF′/US′.
Similarly, an indifference curve for the high-risk type has slope
(5) dw/db = - QHUF′/US′.
As QL<QH, at any point in (b,w) space the low-risk worker’s indifference curve is
flatter than that of the high-risk worker - the "single crossing property" holds. In
Figure 1, these indifference curves are convex to the worker origin O. UL=UL* and
UH=UH* (on which more below) are examples.
Three zero profit lines, necessarily radiating from the firm origin O′, are also
shown in Figure 1. Of these,
(6) RL = PL(F-b) + (1-PL)(S-w) = 0
describes contracts for which firms break even on average when only low-risk types
choose them, and
(7) RH = PH(F-b) + (1-PH)(S-w) = 0
describes contracts for which firms break even, again on average, when only high-
risk types choose these contracts. Finally, the "pooling line" is
(8) R = P(F-b) + (1-P)(S-w) = 0,
where P=θPL+(1-θ)PH and θ is the proportion of low-risk workers. The pooling line
describes the corresponding break-even contracts when both types are equally likely
to choose the contract. On the pooling line, firms break even on average on the
presumption that the probability of the bad state is P. For P, the corresponding odds
ratio is Q=P/(1-P).
7In each case, the zero profit line passes through the firm origin O′. The
respective slopes of the three zero profit lines are -QL, -QH and -Q, where QL<Q<QH
and QL=PL/(1-PL), etc. This means the pooling line has a slope which is steeper than
RL=0 and flatter than RH=0. Since P approaches PL as θ→1, we have also the results
that Q approaches QL and R=0 approaches RL=0, as θ→1.
The model is one of asymmetric information. Workers know their own type,
but since this is private information firms cannot distinguish among workers. There
are two possible solutions to this informed worker/ignorant firm model - a
separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium. But before describing these, it is
helpful to begin by defining four special contracts, which we denote by EH, EL′, EL
and E.
First, contract EH is the contract that maximizes the high-risk type’s utility
(9) UH = PHUF(b) + (1-PH)US(w),
subject to RH=0 (equation (7)). EH is the best the high-risk worker can do, given that
the firm knows the worker’s type and breaks even. Let EH=(bH,wH). EH is
characterized by2
(10a) UF′(bH) = US′(wH)
(10b) wH = S - QH(bH-F).
We denote by UH* the level of utility attained by the high-risk type at EH.
Second, and analogously, contract EL′ maximizes the low-risk type’s utility
(11) UL = PLUF(b) + (1-PL)US(w),
                                          
2 The Lagrangean is
PHUF(b) + (1-PH)US(w) + λ [PH(F-b)+(1-PH)(S-w)].
Differentiating with respect to b and w and equating to zero,
(F1) PHUF′(b) = λPH
(F2) (1-PH)US′(w) = λ (1-PH).
(10a) follows from (F1) and (F2). The constraint gives (10b).
8subject to RL=0 (equation (6)). EL′ is the best the low-risk worker can do, given that
the firm knows the worker’s type and breaks even. Let EL′=(bL′,wL′). Accordingly,
EL′ is characterized by
(12a) UF′(bL′) = US′(wL′)
(12b) wL′ = S - QL(bL′-F).
EH and EL′ are the points where RH=0 and RL=0, respectively, intersect the
"full insurance" line. Shown as the dashed line in Figure 1, the full insurance line is
defined by
(13) UF′(b) = US′(w),
and its slope is
(14) dw/db = UF″/US″.
In the case of state-independent utility, we have UF(.)=US(.) and the full insurance
line becomes a 45-degree line through the worker origin O.
Because workers are assumed to be risk averse, both UF″ and US″ are negative
and the full insurance line has a positive slope. To the left of the line, UF′(.)<US′(.);
and to the right, UF′(.)>US′(.). We assume UF′(F)>US′(S), that is, workers are
underinsured at the firm origin - where they are paid according to their productivity
in the two states. This means the firm origin is to the right of the full insurance line.
Given QL<QH (flatter zero profit line associated with the low-risk worker), the
full insurance line’s positive slope implies bL′>bH and wL′>wH. Thus, as drawn in
Figure 1, wages are higher at EL′ than at EH in both good and bad states, and at EL′
we have UH>UH* (the high risk-type’s utility at EH).
Third, consider the contract, EL, which comes into play when the firm does
not know the worker’s type. EL maximizes the low-risk type’s utility, UL, subject to
RL=0 and UH ≤ UH*, the incentive compatibility condition. The significance of the
9latter condition is that, if it holds, high-risk types have no incentive to switch from
contract EH to EL and mimic the behavior of low-risk types. Since UH>UH* at EL′,
the condition is binding. It follows that EL is determined by the intersection of the
indifference curve, UH=UH*, and the zero profit line, RL=0, and lies between EL′ and
the firm origin, O′.3 Let EL=(bL,wL). By equations (6) and (9), EL is characterized by
(15a) UH* = PHUF(bL) + (1-PH)US(wL)
(15b) wL = S - QL(bL-F).
We denote by UL* the level of utility attained by the low-risk type at EL.
Finally, E is the contract that maximizes the low-risk type’s utility, UL, subject
to R=0, namely, the pooling line given by equation (8). Let E=(bP,wP). Using
equation (11), and proceeding as in footnote 2, E is characterized by
(16a) QLUF′(bP)= QUS′(wP)
(16b) wP = S - Q(bP-F).
Since QL<Q, (16a) implies that UF′>US′ at E, and E lies on the pooling line to
the right of the full insurance line. We will denote by UL** and UH**, respectively,
the levels of utility attained by low-risk and high-risk types at E.
We now describe the two possible solutions. First of all, a separating
equilibrium occurs when UL*>UL**, as depicted in Figure 1. In this equilibrium,
firms offer workers the pair of contracts (EL,EH), with all low-risk types accepting
EL and all high-risk types accepting EH. Competition ensures that (EL,EH) is the pair
of contracts offered. Because firms are risk neutral, in equilibrium they bear all the
                                          
3 We can show that UL declines to the right of EL′ on the line RL=0 (Figure 1). From equation (11), since RL=0 has
slope -QL=-PL/(1-PL),
(F3) dUL/db = PLUF′ + (1-PL)US′(dw/db)
= PL(UF′-US′).
As EL′ lies on the full insurance line, to the right of EL′, UF′>US′. Thus, by (F3), to the right of EL′, dUL/db>0, and
UL declines as benefits are reduced. UH likewise declines to the right of EL′ on the line RL=0, and declines also to
the right of EH on the line RH=0 (the proofs are similar).
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risk in relation to high-risk types, who are fully insured at the point EH. If worker
types were known to firms, so that each type was offered his or her "full information
contract", firms would similarly bear all the risk in relation to low-risk types at the
point EL′. However, with asymmetric information, firms need to identify low-risk
types by offering EL, a contract with a high wage in the good state and a low benefit
in the bad state. EL and EH both lie on the indifference curve UH=UH*, so that high-
risk types have no incentive to "mimic" the behavior of low-risk types.4 A pooling
equilibrium does not result in Figure 1 because UL=UL*, the low-risk type’s
indifference curve through EL, does not intersect the pooling line. In other words,
there is no contract on the pooling line that the low-risk types prefer to EL. (Recall
that the pooling line is the relevant constraint when firms draw workers randomly.)
Second of all, a pooling equilibrium occurs when UL*<UL**, as
depicted in Figure 2. In this equilibrium, only one contract is offered, contract E.
The difference between Figure 2 and Figure 1 is that UL=UL* now intersects the
pooling line. This means that, in comparison with the separating contracts (EL,EH),
both types now do better at E. Firms can "deviate" profitably from (EL,EH), and so
(EL,EH) is not the equilibrium. Low-risk types do better at E than at EL, even though
mimicked at E by the high-risk types, and accordingly a pooling equilibrium results.
In determining whether pooling rather than separation obtains, the magnitude
of θ is critical. The larger θ, the more likely is pooling. If θ is close to one, so that
the pooling line is close to RL=0, low-risk types suffer little from being pooled with
their high-risk counterparts (who are relatively few in number), and low-risk types
find separation is not worth its cost in the form of low insurance against the bad
state.
                                          
4 An assumption here is that the high-risk type cannot obtain insurance outside the firm (cannot "top up" with
insurance), on terms that, starting from EL, allow the high-risk type to attain levels of utility higher than UH*.
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In sum, there are two possible solutions to the model. In the case of a
separating equilibrium (Figure 1), low-risk types are identified by their choice of
contract, namely, a high-wage/low-benefit contract. This is an example of
"screening" which benefits low-risk types even if they face a cost in that they cannot
be fully insured. In the case of a pooling equilibrium (Figure 2), high-risk types
mimic the behavior of their low-risk counterparts and gain in comparison with their
full information contract, EH. High-risk types gain by pooling. We now proceed to
examine the justification for a government mandate in these two situations.
4 Improvements in Welfare
It is clear in our model that, since a firm is free to offer any contract it wishes,
no government-mandated floor can engineer a Pareto improvement. Rather,
competition will ensure that opportunities to make workers better off while firms
still break even are not neglected. The mandate can only restrict the set of contracts
on offer, transforming a separating equilibrium into a pooling equilibrium (Figure
1), or a pooling equilibrium into a pooling equilibrium with a higher level of benefit
(Figure 2). In either case, low-risk workers are made worse off. In Figure 1 they are
better off at EL than at any point on the pooling line; and in Figure 2 better off at E
than at any different point on the pooling line.
However, Summers’ (1989) point is that unregulated labor markets with
asymmetric information fail to achieve efficiency across states (which requires
workers to be fully insured). A mandate can achieve this outcome by imposing as a
minimum the benefit corresponding to A in Figures 1 and 2, where A is the point
where the pooling and full insurance lines intersect. Such a mandate may be
desirable even though it also has a redistributive effect that needs to be taken into
account.
To formalize the discussion, we adopt a generalization of Harsanyi’s (1977)
social welfare function due to Blackorby et al. (1997), namely,
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(17) W = θf(UL) +(1-θ)f(UH).5
Such a social welfare function may be thought to overstate utilitarian principles at
the expense of individual rights, which figure so much in the recent social choice
literature (see for example Pattanaik, 1994). But it has the advantage of simplicity
and will provide us with insights. Varying our previous notation, let (bL,wL) denote
the contract accepted by low-risk types and (bH,wH) that accepted by high-risk
types. Maximizing social welfare subject to the population, risk, and productivity
conditions, the Lagrangean is
(18) θ [PLUF(bL)+(1-PL)US(wL)] + (1-θ)[PHUF(bH)+(1-PH)US(wH)]
+ λ{θ [PLF+(1-PL)S] + (1-θ)[PHF+(1-PH)S]
- θ [PLbL+(1-PL)wL]- (1-θ)[PHbH+(1-PH)wH]}.
The first order conditions then give
(19) UF′(bL) = US′(wL) = UF′(bH) = US′(wH),
together with the zero profit condition. From equations (19), the "first-best"
outcome assigns contract A to each worker (recalling that UF′(b)=US′(w) defines the
full insurance line).
Thus, given our social welfare function, the government can achieve the first-
best outcome by mandating full insurance. Mandating A is optimal for two reasons.
First, A is on the full insurance line and so we have efficiency across states. Second,
A is common to all workers and so we also have efficiency across workers. The
                                          
5 An alternative approach that might be considered relies on the concept of a "potential" Pareto improvement. (A
potential Pareto improvement occurs when "winners" can compensate "losers" and still come out ahead.) However,
when applying this concept in our context, intransitivities arise. A in Figure 1 is a potential improvement on
(EH,EL), since redistribution is possible from A to (EH,EL′) which itself is a Pareto improvement on (EH,EL). Thus A
is "better" than (EH,EL). On the other hand, redistribution is possible also from (EH,EL) back to A, so that (EH,EL) is
no worse than A. A second problem with the concept of a potential Pareto improvement, in our context, is that
winners compensating losers would in practice be impossible. When for example A is mandated, forcing pooling,
low-risk types cannot be compensated by high-risk types, since the latter are not identifiable. Though a popular tool
in many contexts, the concept of a potential Pareto improvement is not useful here.
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redistribution (neglected by Summers) which accompanies the mandate, from low-
risk to high-risk workers, is optimal because it equalizes the marginal utility of
income across workers.
It is worthwhile analyzing the change which a mandate brings about. Starting
from (EL,EH) in Figure 1 or from E in Figure 2, we may think of movement to A as
taking place in two steps. There is an initial shift for each type along corresponding
"actuarially fair" isoprofit lines, which takes them to the full insurance line. This is
a Pareto improvement. Then there is a second shift for each type which unites them
at A. Define "redistribution" as the latter movement.
Under (17), redistribution is good because high-risk types are relatively
deprived and therefore also good "utility generators" (that is, they have a high
marginal utility of income). An illustration is Summers’ example of mandated
company health insurance. Here it seems right for the unhealthy to benefit at a
minor cost to the healthy. Note, however, that were one to introduce moral hazard
into the discussion, high-risk types would no longer automatically emerge as
"deserving". Society might prefer to reward a worker for his or her achievement of
low risk.
It remains that, with homogeneous firms, mandates can improve efficiency
across worker states, and will have redistributive effects that in many cases are seen
as desirable. The policy implications are indeed quite striking. Yet, as we shall see,
the picture can alter quite dramatically once we relax the assumption of identical
firms.
5 Heterogeneous Firms
The problem in a nutshell is that enforced pooling may lead to the
misallocation of workers in a world of heterogeneous firms. As noted earlier,
employing high-risk workers creates greater difficulties for some firms than others.
To demonstrate that misallocation may occur, we generalize the model to the case
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r=2; that is, there are now two types of firm. To fix ideas, we call these "large" and
"small" firms, even though strictly within the terms of the model the size of firms is
for simplicity indeterminate.
Assume there is a separating equilibrium. Let the revenue box for large firms
be (F,S), and the corresponding box for small firms (Fm,Sm) (Figure 3). In general,
these boxes have different dimensions, and for reasons suggested earlier we suppose
that small firms have elongated boxes and large firms have squarer boxes. We know
that the boxes are not "nested" in the sense that one wholly contains the other. If for
instance we had Fm<F and Sm≤S, small firms could not break even employing
workers of either type and would not exist. Accordingly, we have Fm<F and Sm>S.
Intuition suggests that now, with the generalized model, efficiency requires
differences in contracts between small and large firms so as to bring about an
appropriate matching of workers to firms. We explore this.
As before, let the separating contracts be (EL,EH), where EL=(bL,wL) and
EH=(bH,wH). Firms are competitive and cannot make positive profits employing
either worker type. Thus,
(20a) PLbL + (1-PL)wL ≥ PLF + (1-PL)S
(20b) PHbH + (1-PH)wH ≥ PHF + (1-PH)S
(20c) PLbL + (1-PL)wL ≥ PLFm + (1-PL)Sm
(20d) PHbH + (1-PH)wH ≥ PHFm + (1-PH)Sm.
Suppose, hypothetically, that low-risk types work for large firms and high-
risk types for small firms. We can replace weak inequality in (20a) and (20d) by
equality. Substituting into (20b) and (20c) gives
(21a) PHFm + (1-PH)Sm ≥ PHF + (1-PH)S
(21b) PLF + (1-PL)S ≥ PLFm + (1-PL)Sm.
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Adding, we have
(22) (PL-PH)(F-Fm) ≥ (PH-PL)(Sm-S).
Since PL<PH, Fm<F and Sm>S, the left-hand side is negative and the right-hand side
positive, a contradiction. Low-risk types working for large firms and high-risk types
for small firms does not occur.
We are therefore left with just three possibilities:
(A) only high-risk types work for large firms and only low-risk types for small
firms;
(B) a mix of low- and high-risk types works for large firms, but only low-risk
types for small firms;
(C) a mix of low- and high-risk types works for small firms, but only high-risk
types for large firms.
Case (B), which seems the most likely, is illustrated in Figure 3. Since both
types of firm employ low-risk workers, the zero profit line, RL=0, is common to the
two types of firm and touches the corner of both boxes. Large firms offer both EL
and EH, separating the low-risk from the high-risk types. Small firms offer only EL.
It is useful to our purpose to investigate what happens to prices and the
dimensions of the revenue boxes when pooling replaces separation. In general,
prices and box dimensions alter. Let us take case (B). Denote the dimensions of the
revenue boxes under pooling by (F′,S′) for large firms and (Fm′,Sm′) for small firms,
where as before, Fm′<F′ and Sm′>S′. Since low-risk types work for both large and
small firms, we can replace weak inequality in (20a) and (20c) by equality.
Subtracting gives
(23) Sm-S = QL(F-Fm).
The break-even relations under pooling are, from equation (9),
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(24a) PbP + (1-P)wP = PFm′ + (1-P)Sm′
(24b) PbP + (1-P)wP = PF′ + (1-P)S′.
Subtracting, we have for pooling,
(25) Sm′-S′= Q(F′-Fm′).
Thus, since Q>QL, it follows from equations (23) and (25) that
(26) (Sm′-S′)/(Sm-S) > (F′-Fm′)/(F-Fm).
Recall that when prices vary the dimensions of the corresponding revenue
boxes vary in proportion. The two prices vary in opposite directions (for a given
general level of prices). Thus, (26) implies that, if separation is converted into
pooling, prices will fall in the large-firm sector and rise in the small-firm sector. The
effect on box dimensions is F>F′, S>S′, Fm<Fm′ and Sm<Sm′, making the left hand
side of (26) greater than one and the right hand side less than one. Intuitively, prices
for small firms are higher because they now employ some high-risk workers; prices
for large firms are lower because they now have a better mix of workers.
Diagrammatically, the squarer box contracts and the elongated box expands
to a point where the pooling line touches the corners of each. (The large-firm sector
expands and the small-firm sector contracts.) In relation to the revenue boxes
obtaining under separation, the pooling line passes above the corner of the squarer
box and below the corner of the elongated box (Figure 3). Under pooling,
competition requires the two types of firm to have a common pooling line.
A similar argument applies in case (C). A switch from separation to pooling
causes prices now to rise in the large-firm sector and fall in the small-firm sector,
with corresponding box changes. In general, adjustments also take place in case (A).
We now come to the important result we wish to prove, which is that in any
of the three cases the switch in regime from separation to pooling causes a decline
in output and average income. A common factor in (A), (B), and (C) is that high-
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risk types work for large firms and low-risk types for small firms, so that we can
replace weak inequality in (20b) and (20c) by equality. In addition, we have shown
that in one or the other, or both, of (20a) and (20d) inequality must be strict (see
(22)). Variation occurs depending on which of the three cases, (A), (B), or (C), is
operative.
In case (A), for instance, inequality is strict in both (20a) and (20d), so that
(27a) PLFm + (1-PL)Sm > PLF + (1-PL)S
(27b) PHF + (1-PH)S > PHFm + (1-PH)Sm.
(27) shows that at the margin low-risk types are more productive working for
small firms and high-risk types for large firms. This suggests that when a worker’s
sector is randomized by pooling - such that low-risk types move from small to large
firms and high-risk types gravitate in the opposite direction, output will fall.
Rigorously, we can show a fall in income. To show this, note first that by (27)
average income under separation is greater than PF+(1-P)S, and also greater than
PFm+(1-P)Sm. Since both sectors break even, average income under pooling is PF′
+(1-P)S′=PFm′+(1-P)Sm′. We know that either F≥F′ and S≥S′, or else Fm≥Fm′ and Sm
≥Sm′. (If prices rise in the large-firm sector, they fall in the small-firm sector.) It
follows that average income is greater under separation than under pooling.
In case (B), since low-risk types now work in both sectors, equality replaces
strict inequality in (27a); (27b) still applies, however, and randomization again
causes income to fall. In this case average income under separation is PF+(1-P)S,
while average income under pooling equals PF′+(1-P)S′. This shows a fall in
income, since we know that F>F′ and S>S′ (see (26) and the ensuing discussion).
An analogous argument holds for case (C). Thus, in all three cases, the reallocation
of labor induced by pooling reduces output and average income.
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The situation is different where market forces have already resulted in
pooling. If workers are randomly allocated to begin with, designers of mandates do
not have this type of misallocation to worry about.
Our discussion suggests that it may be desirable to restrict the coverage of
mandates. We focus on case (B), which as we have said seems the most likely of the
three cases. Suppose in case (B) that the mandate is restricted to large firms.
Although such firms will be required to offer a contract with a high level of benefit,
small firms will be free to screen out high-risk types. We can show that the
interesting theoretical consequence here is that small firms will now offer a contract
that, though identical to that offered by large firms, successfully creams off low-risk
workers. Although the allocation of workers is efficient (small firms employ only
low-risk types), the contracts offered are distinguished only by which type of firm
makes the offer!
To demonstrate this, denote the contract which small firms offer by EL and
that which large firms offer by E′. As low-risk workers are employed by both types
of firm, an equilibrium condition is that they are indifferent between EL and E′.
Referring to Figure 4, EL lies on the low-risk type’s indifference curve through E′,
which is flatter than the high-risk type’s indifference curve through E′. Call these
curves UL=UL′ and UH=UH′. By the incentive compatibility condition, UH≤UH′, EL
either coincides with or lies to the right of E′, on UL=UL′. Assume E′ is located on
or to the right of the full insurance line - that is, the mandate does not impose over-
insurance on workers, forcing E′ to the left of this line. It follows that the slope of
UL=UL′ (which is QL on the full insurance line) is in absolute terms greater than QL
to the right of E′. However, the isoprofit lines of small firms have slope equal to QL,
and so UL=UL′ to the right of E′ is steeper than these isoprofit lines. Profit
maximization of small firms therefore determines that EL=E′.
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Even though EL=E′, small firms are able to screen out high-risk types when
the mandate is restricted. Intuitively, this is because small firms can threaten to
deviate from the common contract by offering a high-wage/low-benefit contract that
is unattractive to high-risk types. Large firms cannot follow suit. A universal
mandate would eliminate the "deviation" option for small firms, leading to a random
allocation of workers in this case.
The restricted mandate benefits small firms since low-risk types, pooled with
high-risk types in large firms, are cheaper. (The pooling of low-risk and high-risk
types in large firms reduces the wages of low-risk types in large firms, and, by the
same token, in small firms as well.) The prices of products produced by small firms
fall (in Figure 4, the small-firm revenue box shrinks), and the small firm sector
expands. Moreover, there is no loss of output when the mandate is restricted, as
exempted small firms continue to employ only low-risk types. The restricted
mandate thus avoids misallocation of workers in spite of firm heterogeneity.
The caveat in all of this is that there may be additional forms of
heterogeneity, other than the small firm/large firm distinction. Mandates may need
to be restricted in further and more complex ways if misallocation is to be avoided.
6 Government Provision
As an alternative to mandates, governments may themselves provide the
fringe benefit directly. For expositional convenience, we will analyze such
provision in the framework of the simpler one-box model.
Suppose the government pays the worker a benefit z in the bad state, so that
the worker’s utility becomes UF(b+z). This provision is financed by a break-even tax
of Qz on the worker in the good state, so that in the good state the worker’s utility is
US(w-Qz). (Recall that Q=P/(1-P).) Diagrammatically, an increase in government
provision shifts the worker origin, O, rightward and downward in relation to the
revenue box (see Figure 5).
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We investigate first the effect of varying government provision on E, the low-
risk worker’s preferred contract on the pooling line. Referring to (1), E is
constrained to be on or to the left of the firm origin O′. Thus, E can be either an
interior solution or the corner solution, E=O′. As an interior solution, E is
characterized by6
(28a) QLUF′(bP+z) = QUS′(wP-Qz)
(28b) wP-Qz = S - Q(bP+z-F).
Equations (28) determine bP+z and wP-Qz uniquely. Thus, when E is an
interior solution, any variation in government provision of the benefit is exactly
offset by a compensating variation in firm provision. Increasing z affects neither the
total benefit, bP+z, nor the net wage wP-Qz, and the workers’ utilities at E, UL** and
UH**, are likewise unaffected. Intuitively, the explanation for this result is that E is
governed by the low-risk type’s preferences, and the terms on which the low-risk
type obtains additional benefits are the same irrespective of whether these are
provided by firms or by government. In either case, cost is based on average risk.
Consequently, as z increases, bP is reduced until eventually bP=F. Diagrammatically,
E moves toward the revenue box until it coincides with the firm origin O′ (Figure
5). Ultimately, if not initially, we arrive at the corner solution, E=O′.
We can also investigate the effect of varying government provision on the
pair of separating contracts, EH and EL (as defined in Section II), and on the worker
utilities associated with these contracts. Omitting proofs (which are available from
the authors on request), the results are:
                                          
6 Adapting equations (8) and (11), the Lagrangean for the determination of E is
PLUF(b+z) + (1-PL)US(w-Qz) + λ [P(F-b) + (1-P)(S-w)].
Differentiating with respect to b and w, and equating to zero,
(F4) PLUF′ = λP
(F5) (1-PL)US′ = λ (1-P).
Dividing gives (28a). The constraint gives (28b).
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(A) At EH, the utility of high-risk types increases with government
provision z, and total benefit, bH+z, also increases. The intuitive explanation for this
increased utility of high-risk types is that they obtain additional benefits on good
terms. Although they experience greater than average risk of failure, they are taxed
at just average risk.
(B) At EL, the utility of low-risk types may or may not increase with
government provision z, although total benefit, bL+z, will again increase. The
redistributive effect in this case operates against low-risk types - experiencing lower
than average risk of failure, they are taxed at average risk. However, there is a
further effect. As z increases, low-risk types can receive a higher level of benefit
without being mimicked by high-risk types, and paradoxically, this beneficial effect
can more than offset the pure redistributive effect.7
We now draw some conclusions about the effects of direct government
provision on labor markets. Absent government provision, there can be either
pooling or separation, but for the sake of argument let us suppose pooling. Figure 6
illustrates.
Equations (28) show that, as z increases from zero, there is at first no net
effect on workers’ benefits, wages, or welfare. But this situation does not persist.
With increasing z, there will occur a switch in regime from pooling to separation: as
E moves toward the revenue box, eventually E=O′ at which point there is
separation. Workers are now better off with the separating contracts (EL,EH) than
with pooling at O′. Low- and high-risk types each gain from obtaining insurance at
a cost that is actuarially fair. Interestingly, as depicted in Figure 6, there may be a
range within which increases in z achieve Pareto improvements (see (A) and (B)
                                          
7 This Pareto improvement result is also derived heuristically by Wilson (1977, 200), though he errs in claiming that
Pareto improvements can always be achieved. A similar effect occurs when a firm, which is able to offer more than
one contract, uses a profit-making contract aimed at low-risk types to balance a loss-making contract designed for
high-risk types. The advantage gained is that the subsidized high-risk types are less inclined to mimic the low-risk
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above). Beyond this, increases in z, by subsidizing high-risk types at the expense of
their low-risk counterparts, continue to make high-risk types better off but now
penalize low-risk types.
We see that government provision has the advantage over a mandate that it is
able to retain separation and also to convert pooling into separation. Losses which
arise under mandates due to the misallocation of labor (documented in Section IV)
are avoidable with government provision. Another advantage is that the taxes which
fund government provision can be progressive. However, taxes are distortionary.
These distortions, which are crucial to the argument of Summers (1989), fail to
appear in our model because of the full employment assumption and also by reason
of the focused nature of the taxes concerned. Relaxation of these assumptions
means that distortions would surface. That said, we have demonstrated that
government provision has certain advantages over mandates ignored in the extant
literature.
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided a formal underpinning for recent arguments in the
labor economics literature, based on asymmetric information, for government-
imposed mandates. We have shown that mandates may improve welfare. They can
bring about an efficient allocation of income across worker states, and the
accompanying redistribution of income across workers will in some instances
accord with notions of equity. Mandates may of course also reduce output.
Specifically, where worker types are separated in a world of heterogeneous firms,
mandates may lower productive efficiency, substituting a random allocation of labor
for the purposive sorting mechanism that in regular markets exploits separation. We
have reported that targeting may be able in some measure to side-step these
inefficiencies.
                                                                                                                                         
types (see Cave, 1984, in the insurance market context).
23
A further concern of the paper has been the issue of direct provision of the
benefit by government. It is conventional to argue that mandates dominate
government provision by reason of the greater tax distortions associated with the
latter. Against this, we were able to show that direct provision can have the
advantage of avoiding any misallocation attendant upon pooling and the consequent
randomization of labor allocation. Direct provision may thus be a more efficient
redistributive tool, less costly in its implied output losses.
To conclude, our framework has been broad. An important task for the future
is to identify and parameterize those mandates that do fit the mold of adverse
selection. Other issues that may need to be accommodated within the existing
insurance framework include the availability of external insurance (allowing
workers to top-up their firm benefits), and cross-subsidization (which was ruled out
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